Competitive negotiators frequently use tactics which others view as "unethical", in that these tactics either violate standards of truth telling or violate the perceived rules of negotiation. This paper sought to determine how business students viewed a number of marginally ethical negotiating tactics, and to determine the underlying factor structure of these tactics. The factor analysis of these tactics revealed five clear factors which were highly similar across the two samples, and which parallel (to a moderate degree) categories of tactics (...) proposed by earlier theory. Data from one sample also permitted comparisons of the appropriateness of certain tactics across gender, nationality, ethnic origin and perception of one's negotiating style. (shrink)

Purpose – To review and discuss Luciano Floridi’s 2019 book The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design, the latest instalment in his philosophy of information (PI) tetralogy, particularly with respect to its implications for library and information studies (LIS). Design/methodology/approach – Nine scholars with research interests in philosophy and LIS read and responded to the book, raising critical and heuristic questions in the spirit of scholarly dialogue. Floridi responded to these questions. Findings – Floridi’s PI, including (...) this latest publication, is of interest to LIS scholars, and much insight can be gained by exploring this connection. It seems also that LIS has the potential to contribute to PI’s further development in some respects. Research implications – Floridi’s PI work is technical philosophy for which many LIS scholars do not have the training or patience to engage with, yet doing so is rewarding. This suggests a role for translational work between philosophy and LIS. Originality/value – The book symposium format, not yet seen in LIS, provides forum for sustained, multifaceted and generative dialogue around ideas. (shrink)

Discerning the decisionmaking of Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean regime on issues of peaceful engagement and warlike actions endures as a mighty challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers. In this report, we seek to inform analysis of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership decisionmaking. To do so, we use three discussion papers that were written to facilitate discussion of an interagency working group. The three papers are assembled here in a single report. The first discussion paper describes (...) decisionmaking among different authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, and the opening up of those economies to outside engagement. The second paper outlines two different scenarios that might occur when conventional deterrence on the Korean Peninsula breaks down and the resulting decisions that North Korea’s leadership could face. The third paper assesses DPRK decisionmaking about nuclear weapon use. The report concludes with some observations, drawn from the issues covered in these three discussion papers, about DPRK decisionmaking and stability on the Korean Peninsula. (shrink)

This paper proposes that there is common ground between H.J. Rose’s A Handbook of Greek Mythology and Robert Graves’s The Greek Myths, in that both seem to think that it is a bad idea to meet a certain demand: to provide a handbook that is reliable, easy to consult, and suitable for students of certain literary tastes.

This paper reflects on an article that appeared after the death of A.J. Ayer, which complains about what British philosophers focus on. I propose that the content of the philosophy curriculum can be predicted from a rational actor model.

In this paper, I present two puzzles arising from J.M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello, a fiction which is closely connected to analytic philosophy.

This paper pays tribute to the distinguished legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz, who recently passed away. I present a response to Donald Davidson on conceptual schemes which tries to imitate Raz’s writing style, which attracts me despite the difficulties it poses. The response includes a definition.

This paper considers whether the saying, “It’s who you know, not what you know” can be used instead of jargon-laden studies of inequality. I argue that it is not a good replacement in some cases and present a challenge to standard Bourdieusian explanations of inequality in some fields. The paper is written as a pastiche of the distinguished political philosopher Joseph Raz.

This paper contains a brief pastiche of analytic philosopher Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, responding to the sociological theories of Pierre Bourdieu.

J.G. Frazer tells us about a last resort technique which Cambodian hunters use when they have caught nothing in their nets. The “technique” is they act as if they themselves have got caught in the net. Frazer explains this as the consequence of magical thinking, but I propose a different explanation.

This paper presents an objection to the theory of names according to which what a name refers to is determined by a description that the speaker or writer associates with that name. Some names are associated with paradoxical descriptions. I use the reputations of Henry Sidgwick and J.M.E. McTaggart to illustrate this problem.

This is a one page handout, presenting a puzzle from J.G. Frazer regarding why, to become the priest of Diana at Nemi, one had to first break a bough in the sacred grove.

Chapter 14. Andrea Timár engages with literary representations of the experience of perpetrators of dehumanization. Her chapter focuses on perpetrators of dehumanization who do not violate laws of their society (i.e., they are not criminals) but exemplify what Simona Forti, inspired by Hannah Arendt, calls “the normality of evil.” Through the parallel examples of Dezső Kosztolányi’s Anna Édes (1926) and Doris Lessing’s The Grass is Singing (1950), Timár first explores a possible clash between criminals and perpetrators of dehumanization, showing literature’s (...) exceptional ability to reveal the gap between ethics and law. Second, she examines novels focalized through perpetrators and the difficult narrative empathy they provoke, arguing that only the critical reading of these novels can make one engage with the potential perpetrator in oneself. As case studies, Timár examines Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), which may potentially turn its reader into an accomplice in the process of dehumanization, and J.M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), which puts on critical display the dehumanizing potentials of both aesthetic representation and sympathy as imaginative violence. Third, she reads Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones [Les Bienveillantes, 2006], which can make the reader question, through the polyphony of the voice of its protagonist, the notions of narrative voice and readerly empathy, only to reveal that the difficulty involved in empathizing with perpetrator characters lies not so much in the characters’ being perpetrators, but rather in their being literary characters. Eventually, Timár briefly touches upon the problem of the aesthetic and the comic via Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) to ask whether one can avoid some necessarily dehumanizing aspects of humor. (shrink)

Vlastos, G. Introduction: the paradox of Socrates.--Lacey, A. R. Our knowledge of Socrates.--Dover, K. J. Socrates in the Clouds.--Robinson, R. Elenchus.--Robinson, R. Elenchus, direct and indirect.--Robinson, R. Socratic definition.--Nakhnikian, G. Elenctic definitions.--Cohen, S. M. Socrates on the definition of piety: Euthyphro 10A-11B.--Santas, G. Socrates at work on virtue and knowledge in Plato's Laches.--Burnyeat, M. F. Virtues in action.--Walsh, J. J. The Socratic denial of Akrasia.--Santas, G. Plato's Protagoras and explanations of weakness.--Woozley, A. D. Socrates on disobeying the (...) law.--Allen, R. E. Plato's earlier theory of forms. (shrink)

Interpreters have found it exceedingly difficult to understand how Hume could be right in claiming that his two definitions of ‘cause’ are essentially the same. As J. A. Robinson points out, the definitions do not even seem to be extensionally equivalent. Don Garrett offers an influential solution to this interpretative problem, one that attributes to Hume the reliance on an ideal observer. I argue that the theoretical need for an ideal observer stems from an idealized concept of definition, which (...) many interpreters, including Garrett, attribute to Hume. I argue that this idealized concept of definition indeed demands an unlimited or infinite ideal observer. But there is substantial textual evidence indicating that Hume disallows the employment of idealizations in general in the sciences. Thus Hume would reject the idealized concept of definition and its corresponding ideal observer. I then put forward an expert-relative reading of Hume’s definitions of ‘cause’, which also renders both definitions extensionally equivalent. On the expert-relative reading, the meaning of ‘cause’ changes with better observations and experiments, but it also allows Humean definitions to play important roles within our normative practices. Finally, I consider and reject Henry Allison’s argument that idealized definitions and their corresponding infinite minds are necessary for expert reflection on the limitations of current science. (shrink)

Berkeley doesn't use the Time-Gap Argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Three Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only perceive ideas, (...) is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, A. C. Grayling, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the Time-Gap Argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian Idealism. I also idnicate how the latter provides a solution to J. J. Valberg's "puzzle of experience" and disarms James Cornman's argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem. (shrink)

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...) is conceived as being capable of intentional action—and hence as being an agent—only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent while ignoring those agents who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk. I hope for a moral psychology that has room for the whole motley crew. I shall begin by examining why some philosophers have thought that the attitudes motivating intentional actions involve judgments of value. I shall then argue that their conception of these attitudes is incorrect. Finally, I shall argue that practical reason should not be conceived as a faculty for pursuing value. (shrink)

Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...) shared, these accounts fail to resolve what seems problematic in the notion of shared intention. It then offers an account in which the problem of shared intention is resolved, because intention can indeed be literally shared. This account is derived from Margaret Gilbert’s notion of a “pool of wills,” to which it applies Searle’s definition of intention. (shrink)

RESUMO A inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) é uma das biotecnologias de reprodução mais estudadas dos últimos anos, e a busca pelo equilíbrio entre a fisiologia animal e o controle hormonal fomenta uma série de estudos. Sendo assim, o objetivo com este trabalho foi avaliar a eficiência da aplicação do hormônio liberador de gonadotrofinas (GnRH) no dia zero (D0) do protocolo de IATF, a base de estrógeno e progesterona sobre a taxa de penhez por IATF. O experimento foi desenvolvido (...) na Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU), na Fazenda Experimental do Glória, localizada no município de Uberlândia, no estado de Minas Gerais. Foram avaliadas 69 inseminações de vacas leiteiras mestiças, divididas em dois grupos com diferentes protocolos; Controle: sem aplicação de GnRH e Tratamento: aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo. Todos os animais foram inseminados com sêmen previamente analisado. O diagnóstico de gestação foi realizado 32 dias após a inseminação, com aparelho de ultrassonografia equipado com probe linear transretal de 7,5 MHz. Os dados foram analisados por análise descritiva, sendo avaliado o efeito da relação protocolo e presença de corpo lúteo no início do protocolo e efeito da relação protocolo e ordem de IA Pós-Parto sobre a taxa de concepção. A taxa de concepção após a realização do Protocolo Tratamento foi de 53% (17/32) e do Protocolo Controle foi de 43% (16/37). Portanto, conclui-se que o protocolo de sincronização de vacas leiteiras mestiças com a aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo resultou em um aumento no número da taxa de concepção de vacas leiteiras mestiças. Palavras-chave: biotecnologia; bovinocultura; hormônio; ovulação; reprodução. ABSTRACT The artificial insemination at fixed time (AIFT) is one of the most studied reproduction biotechnologies in recent years, and the search for a balance between animal physiology and hormonal control fosters a series of studies. Therefore, the objective of this work was to to evaluate the efficiency of gonadotrofine hormone inducer (GnRH) on day zero (D0) of the AIFT protocol, an estrogen and progesterone base on an AIFT rate. The experiment was developed at the Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU), at the Experimental Farm of Glória, located in the municipality of Uberlândia, in the state of Minas Gerais. Were evaluated 69 inseminations of crossbred dairy cows divided into two groups with different protocols; Control: without application of GnRH and Treatment: application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol. All animals were inseminated with previously analyzed semen. The diagnosis of pregnancy was performed 32 days after insemination, with an ultrasound device equipped with a 7.5 MHz transrectal linear probe. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, evaluating the effect of the protocol relationship and the presence of corpus luteum at the beginning of the protocol and the effect of the protocol relationship and postpartum AI order on the conception rate. The conception rate after performing of the Treatment Protocol was 53% (17/32) and the Control Protocol was 43% (16/37). Therefore, it is concluded that the synchronization protocol of crossbred dairy cows with the application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol resulted in an increase in the number of conception rates of crossbred dairy cows. Keywords: biotechnology; cattle breeding; hormone; ovulation; reproduction. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ATANASOV, A. S.; DINEVA, J. D.; YOTOV, S. A. Ultrasonic evaluation of uterine involution in Bulgarian Murrah buffalo after administration of oxytocin. Animal Reproduction Science, v.133, p.71-76, 2012. BALL, P. J. H.; PETERS, A. R. Reprodução em bovinos. São Paulo – SP. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 40, p. 79-84, 2011. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, Viçosa, MG, v. 40, n. 1, pág. 79-84, 2011. BARROS, C. M.; FIGUEIREDO, R. A.; PINHEIRO, O. L. Estro, ovulação e dinâmica folicular em zebuínos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.19, p. 9-22, 1995. BARUSELLI, P. S. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Departamento de reprodução animal, Universidade de São Paulo, 2000. BARUSELLI, P. S. et al. Review: Using artificial insemination v. natural service in beef herds. Animal, London, v. 12, p. 45-52, 2018. BEG, M. A.; GINTHER, O. J. Follicle selection in cattle and horses: role of intrafollicular factors. Reproduction, v. 132, pag. 365-377, 2006. BERTAN, C. M.; BINELLI, M.; MADUREIRA, E. H. Caracterização do estro de novilhas cruzadas (Bos taurus indicus x Bos taurus taurus) por radiotelemetria. Brazilian Journal of Veterinary Research and Animal Science, São Paulo, v. 43, n. 6, p. 816-823, 2006. BÓ, G. A.; BARUSELLI, P. S.; MARTINEZ, M. F. Pattern and manipulation of follicular development in Bos indicus cattle. Animal Reproduction Science, v.78, p.307-326, 2003. BÓ, G.; CUTAIA, P. S; BARUSELLI. Programas de inseminación artificial y transferencia de embriones a tiempo fijo. In: SIMPÓSIO INTERNACIONAL DE REPRODUÇÃO APLICADA, 1., 2004, Londrina [Trabalhos apresentados] Cornélio Procópio: Geraembryo, 2004. p. 56-81. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 12 nov. 2022. BORGES, A. M. et al. 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Parâmetros reprodutivos, metabólitos e produção de leite de vacas mestiças Holandês x Zebu submetidas a dois manejos pré-parto. Tese (Doutorado em Medicina Veterinária) - Escola de Veterinária, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 2009. CASTILHO, E. F. IATF como ferramenta no melhoramento genético de bovinos de leite. In: CASTILHO, E. F. (org.). Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) em bovinos leiteiros. 1. ed. Maringá: IEPEC, 2015. p. 148-191. CHEBEL, R. C. et al. Factors affecting conception rate after artificial insemination and pregnancy loss in lactating dairy cows. Animal Reproduction Science, v.84, p.239-255, 2004. CLIMATE DATA ORG. Clima Uberlândia. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. de 2022. Curso de Transferência de Embriões, Uberlândia: ASBIA, 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Endocrinologia da Reprodução Animal. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro; DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal. 2020. D’AVILA, C. A. et al. Hormônio utilizados na indução da ovulação em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v. 43, n. 4, p. 797-802, out./dez.2019. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. DEMÉTRIO, D.G.B. et al. Factors affecting conception rates following artificial insemination or embryo transfer in lactating Holstein cows. Journal of Dairy Science, v.90, p.5073-5082, 2007. DUARTE JUNIOR, M. F. et al. Aspectos relacionados a fisiologia do anestro pós parto em bovinos. Colloquium Agrariae, Cuiabá, v.9, p.43-71, 2013. DUKES, H. H.; SWENSON, M. J.; REECE, W. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. 12. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2006. FERREIRA, A. M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Edição do Autor, 2010. FINK, G. Gonadotropin secretion and its control. In: KNOBIL, E.; NEILL, J. (ed.), The physiology of reproduction. New York: Raven Press, 1988. p. 1349-1377. FOLMAN, Y. et al. Comparison of methods for the synchronization of estrous cycles in dairy cows. 2. Effects of progesterone and parity on conception. Journal of Dairy Science, v.73, p.2817-2825, 1990. FONSECA, F. A. et al. Reproductive traits of Holsteins and Jerseys. Effects of age, milk yield, and clinical abnormalities on involution of cervix and uterus, ovulation, estrous cycles, detection of estrus, conception rate, and days open. Journal of Dairy Science, v.66, p.1128- 1147, 1983. FORTUNE, J. E.; RIVERA, G. M.; YANG, M. Y. 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C., Uso do protocolo Crestar® em tratamentos utilizando benzoato de estradiol, PGF2α, PMSG e GnRH para controle do ciclo estral e ovulação em vacas de corte. 2002, 62f. Dissertação de Mestrado, Piracicaba, 2003. MOSES, V. S.; BERTONE, A. L. Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. Veterinary Clinics of North America, v.18, p.21-37, 2002. NAKAMURA, T.; SAKAMOTO, K. Reactive oxygen species up-regulates cyclooxygenase2, p53, and Bax mRNA expression in bovine luteal cells. Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications. v.284 p.203-210. 2001. NASSER, L. F. T. Resposta superovulatória na primeira onda de crescimento folicular em doadoras Nelore (Bos taurus indicus). 2006, 80f. Tese (Doutorado) - USP. FMVZ. Departamento de reprodução animal, São Paulo. OLIVEIRA, M. Fisiologia da reprodução bovina e métodos de controle do ciclo estral. 2006. 28 f. Tese (Especialização em Reprodução e Produção de Bovinos) -UNIVERSIDADE CASTELO BRANCO, Rio de Janeiro, 2006. PALHANO, H. B. Reprodução em Bovinos, LF livros de veterinária, 2 edição, 2008, 249p. PONCIO, V. A. P. EFICIÊNCIA DE DOIS PROTOCOLOS DE IATF UTILIZANDO BENZOATO DE ESTRADIOL OU GnRH. Nova Odessa. 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. PURSLEY, J. R.; MEE, M. O.; WILTBANK, M. C. Synchronization of ovulation in dairy cows using PGF2α and GnRH. Theriogenology, v.44, p.915-923, 1995. REICHENBACH, H. D.; MORAES, J. C. F.; NEVES, J. P. 2008. Tecnologia do sêmen e inseminação artificial em bovinos. In: Gonçalves P. B. D.; Figueiredo J. R. e Freitas V. J. F. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ed. Roca. 395 p. ROBINSON, R. S. et al. Corpus luteum-endometriumembryo interactions in the dairy cow: underlying mechanisms and clinical relevance. Reproduction in Domestic Animals, v.43, p.104-12, 2008. Roca, 3ª Edição, 232 p., 2006. RUAS, J. R. M. et al. Vacas F1 Holandês x Zebu: uma opção para sistema de produção de leite em condições tropicais. Inf. 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J.; REECE, W., Dukes Fisiologia dos Animais Domésticos, Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1996. cap. 36, p. 615-644. VALLE, E. R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. Campo Grande: EMBRAPA – CNPGC, 1991. 24p. (EMBRAPA-CNPGC. Documentos, 48). VISHWANATH, R. Artificial insemination: the state of the art. Theriogenology, v.59, p.571- 584, 2003. WOLFENSON, D. et al. The effect of a GnRH analogue on the dynamics of follicular development and synchronization of estrus in lactating cyclic dairy cows. Theriogenology, v.42, p.633- 644, 1994. YAMADA, K. Desenvolvimento da sincronização da ovulação e inseminação artificial em tempo fixo em vacas leiteiras. Jornal de Reprodução e Desenvolvimento, Nagoya, v. 51, n. 2, pág. 177-186, 2005. (shrink)

A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will (...) depend on its adequacy as an explanation. Can we account for the explanatory force of narrative with the models of explanation available in the philosophy of science? Or does narrative convey a different kind of understanding, which requires a different model and perhaps even a term other than ‘explanation’? (shrink)

Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve (...) the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account. (shrink)

Might it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be 'metaphysical'? How does the phenomenon relate to 'ontic vagueness', the existence of 'vague objects', 'de re indeterminacy' and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating (...) this distinctive sort of indefiniteness? Conversely, are there reasons for denying that there is indefiniteness of this sort? (shrink)

Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘ eligibility ’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but (...) instead flows naturally from three independently motivated elements; and to show that severe limitations afflict the proposal. In conclusion, I pick out the element of the eligibility response that is responsible for the limitations: future work in this area should therefore concentrate on amending this aspect of the overall theory. (shrink)

This article investigates the claim that some truths are fundamentally or really true — and that other truths are not. Such a distinction can help us reconcile radically minimal metaphysical views with the verities of common sense. I develop an understanding of the distinction whereby Fundamentality is not itself a metaphysical distinction, but rather a device that must be presupposed to express metaphysical distinctions. Drawing on recent work by Rayo on anti-Quinean theories of ontological commitments, I formulate a rigourous theory (...) of the notion. In the final sections, I show how this package dovetails with ' interpretationist' theories of meaning to give sober content to thought that some things — perhaps sets, or gerrymandered mereological sums — can be 'postulated into existence'. (shrink)

The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered.

Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003), with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might-argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might-counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should (...) resolve this tension by dropping the Hypothesis, not by dropping CEM. (shrink)

As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way (...) that does it justice. To say that the will is a good thing, however, would imply that having a will is better than not having one, or that using it is better than not using it - neither of which I am prepared to assert as a general rule. Speaking metaphorically, I would say that the will is like a magic wand. In fairy tales, the character who looks upon a magic wand as an unalloyed good is destined to be sadder but wiser in the end. Being a magician isn't better than being an ordinary human, just different; and a magician must value his powers by respecting them and therefore using them appropriately, even sparingly, not by using them as much as possible. (shrink)

Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible.

The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than (...) temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. We also discuss what role the endurance / perdurance distinction, so understood, should play in the debates about time, material objects and personal identity. (shrink)

This paper examines two puzzles of indeterminacy. The first puzzle concerns the hypothesis that there is a unified phenomenon of indeterminacy. How are we to reconcile this with the apparent diversity of reactions that indeterminacy prompts? The second puzzle focuses narrowly on borderline cases of vague predicates. How are we to account for the lack of theoretical consensus about what the proper reaction to borderline cases is? I suggest (building on work by Maudlin) that the characteristic feature of indeterminacy is (...) alethic normative silence, and use this to explain both plurality and lack of consensus. (shrink)

Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The (...) essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire. (shrink)

Joyce (1998) gives an argument for probabilism: the doctrine that rational credences should conform to the axioms of probability. In doing so, he provides a distinctive take on how the normative force of probabilism relates to the injunction to believe what is true. But Joyce presupposes that the truth values of the propositions over which credences are defined are classical. I generalize the core of Joyce’s argument to remove this presupposition. On the same assumptions as Joyce uses, the credences of (...) a rational agent should always be weighted averages of truth value assignments. In the special case where the truth values are classical, the weighted averages of truth value assignments are exactly the probability functions. But in the more general case, probabilistic axioms formulated in terms of classical logic are violated—but we will show that generalized versions of the axioms formulated in terms of non-classical logics are satisfied. (shrink)

Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines a (...) dutch book, but we only have a partial converse. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rima Basu and I have offered separate accounts of wokeness as an anti-racist ethical concept. Our accounts endorse controversial doctrines in epistemology: doxastic wronging, doxastic voluntarism, and moral encroachment. Many philosophers deny these three views, favoring instead some ordinary standards for epistemic justification. I call this denial the standard view. In this paper, I offer an account of wokeness that is consistent with the standard view. I argue that wokeness is best understood as ‘group epistemic partiality’. The woke person (...) does extra epistemic work before forming a negative belief about a member of an oppressed social group. Just as we do extra epistemic work when forming belief about our friends, so the woke person does for members of oppressed social groups. I first outline the account. I then raise questions about the scope of wokeness and belief formation. After this, I demonstrate that the group partiality view is consistent with the standard view in epistemology. The partiality view, therefore, should appeal to epistemologists who have adopted the standard view because it is consistent with ordinary standards of justification. I conclude that wokeness as a concept in epistemology should not be controversial for those who endorse the standard view. (shrink)

Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a Decision Ought Challenge—to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario. This article is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision ought for cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best representative for each is identified.

Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.

In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns (...) such as reductio and conditional proof. (shrink)

I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things. * This is the third in a series of four papers on narrative self-conceptions and their role in moral motivation. In the first paper, “The Self as Narrator” (to appear in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. Joel Anderson and John Christman), I explore the motivational role of narrative self-conceptions, (...) drawing on Daniel Dennett’s notion of the self as a “center of narrative gravity”. In the second paper, “Willing the Law” (in Practical Conflicts, ed. Monika Betzler and Peter Baumann [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming]), I explore the role of selfconceptions in Kantian “conflicts in the will”, drawing on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of “practical identities”. In a fourth paper, “A Sense of Self” (ms), I explore the role of narrative self-con-ceptions in Kantian “conflicts in conception”, drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel and John Perry on the self. (shrink)

In their thought-provoking article, Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) defend the view that the status—both epistemic and ethical—of Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) used in psychotherapy is complicated. While therapeutic CAI seems to be more than a mere tool implementing particular therapeutic techniques, it falls short of being a “digital therapist.” One of the main arguments supporting the latter claim is that even though “the interaction with CAI happens in the course of conversation… the conversation is profoundly different from a conversation with (...) a human therapist” (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023, 8). In particular, unlike a human therapist, CAI cannot help its users gain new insight and self-understanding (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023). We agree that currently available therapeutic CAI cannot be considered a “digital therapist,” however, we think that the issue surrounding the acquisition of new self-understanding in the interaction with therapeutic CAI is more complicated than Sedlakova and Trachsel suggest. (shrink)

I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker's framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle -- concerning so-called 'reverse Sobel sequences' -- can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theoryneutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, (...) relies on the interplay between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called "Gibbard phenomenon" for indicative conditionals. (shrink)

The question of the cognitive role of fictionality is this: what is the correct cognitive attitude to take to p, when it is fictional that p? We began by considering one answer to this question, implicit in the work of Kendall Walton, that the correct response to a fictional proposition is to imagine that proposition. However, this approach is silent in cases of fictional incompleteness, where neither p nor its negation are fictional. We argue that that Waltonians should embrace a (...) pluralistic account of the cognitive role of fictional incompleteness: in some cases of fictional incompleteness, we are permitted to resolve the incompleteness during our engagement with the target fiction, and in other cases, we are obliged not to resolve the incompleteness. But though pluralism is accommodated by Walton’s wider account of fictionality, it puts tension on his motivating idea that fictionality stands to the imagination as truth stands to belief. And so we develop a rival conception of the cognitive role of fictionality that is built around a different analogy: on this evidentialist approach, (known) fictionality stands to the imagination as evidence stands to credence. (shrink)

Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the bare-bones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. The paper explores one methodology for choosing between the logics: pick a logic thatnorms beliefas classical consequence is standardly thought to do. The main focus of the paper considers a variant of standard supervaluational, on which we can characterizedegrees of determinacy. It applies the methodology above to focus ondegree logic. (...) This is developed first in a basic, single-premise case; and then extended to the multipremise case, and to allowdegreesof consequence. The metatheoretic properties of degree logic are set out. On the positive side, the logic is supraclassical—all classical valid sequents are degree logic valid. Strikingly, metarules such as cut and conjunction introduction fail. (shrink)

Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of 'infinite descending complexity' ('onion worlds'). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

There are advantages to thrift over honest toil. If we can make do without numbers we avoid challenging questions over the metaphysics and epistemology of such entities; and we have a good idea, I think, of what a nominalistic metaphysics should look like. But minimizing ontology brings its own problems; for it seems to lead to error theory— saying that large swathes of common-sense and best science are false. Should recherche philosophical arguments really convince us to give all this up? (...) Such Moorean considerations are explicitly part of the motivation for the recent resurgence of structured metaphysics, which allow a minimal (perhaps nominalistic) fundamental ontology, while avoiding error-theory by adopting a permissive stance towards ontology that can be argued to be grounded in the fundamental. This paper evaluates the Moorean arguments, identifying key epistemological assumptions. On the assumption that Moorean arguments can be used to rule out error-theory, I examine deflationary ‘representationalist’ rivals to the structured metaphysics reaction. Quinean paraphrase, fictionalist claims about syntax and semantics are considered and criticized. In the final section, a ‘direct’ deflationary strategy is outlined and the theoretical obligations that it faces are articulated. The position advocated may have us talking a lot like a friend of structured metaphysics—but with a very different conception of what we’re up to. (shrink)

I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral (...) development. As I reconstruct it, Kant's argument yields an imperative commanding us to act for reasons whose validity we can consistently will to be common knowledge among all agents. Universalizing a maxim thus turns out to consist in willing, not that there be some universally quantified rule of conduct, but rather that a principle of practical reasoning be common knowledge - as a principle of reasoning ought to be. (shrink)